The
problem of loss of investor confidence due to unsuitable investment advice cannot
be solved by more transparency alone, he posited, adding that tackling poor incentives
only via corrective measures like internal controls and external supervision
can add costs and will too often fail to achieve the desired outcome. Getting
the incentives right for providing good and suitable investment advice to
clients is a condition precedent to rebuilding investor trust.
While
he is convinced that banning inducements will contribute to the development of
a viable business model with a high level of investor trust, the ESMA Chair
also called for efforts to improve financial awareness among investors. He understands that it will take some
adjustments, both on the industry side and the investor side, to move to a new
business model without inducements. Thus,
allowing sufficient time to all stakeholders to adjust before a ban is
introduced would be reasonable.
He
acknowledged industry concerns that banning inducements might affect the
competitive positions between banks and advisers or other intermediaries. These competition concerns vary with the predominant
distribution model, he noted. In some EU member states banks are the main
distributers of financial products, he observed, while in other member states,
like the UK ,
intermediaries and independent advisers are an important distribution channel
of financial products. But whatever the
distribution model, the ESMA Chair endorsed a level playing field between the
various distributors.
For
their part, investment advisers and other financial intermediaries have raised
concerns about how a ban on inducements may negatively affect their competitive
positions. Banks can recommend products that they have originated and there are
no explicit inducements involved. However, Chairman Maijoor pointed out that there
could still be conflicts of interest in this situation. When offering a range of products, advisers
within a bank might be tempted to be
biased towards their in-house products or to those in-house products
with a higher benefit to the bank. In
order to address this risk, regulators should not only look at inducements, but
also look at the remuneration of advisers and sales staff in financial
institutions.
During
last decades a number of scandals have affected
retail investor across Europe . In the Chair’s view, a key factor identified
as a driver for the recommendation and selling of unsuitable products is the
presence of financial incentive schemes
for financial intermediaries that do not take account of the clients’ best
interests. The proposed remuneration guidelines for MiFID investment firms are
key to ensuring that the pay and incentive structures do not create false
incentives when selling financial products to retail investors. The consistent application of ESMA’s
remuneration guidelines will help strengthen investor protection and achieve the same level of protection for Europe ’s retail
investors no matter where they invest.