Indeed, the independent consultant had no relationship
with the court. The court did not select or supervise the consultant and had no
authority to extend the consultant’s tenure or modify his authority. The
consent decree gave the independent consultant no powers unique to individuals possessing judicial authority, nor did it require the
consultant to file his reports with the court. In fact, the consent decree did not by its
terms directly require anything from the independent consultant; it simply
specified the work AIG would engage the independent consultant to perform.
The consent decree was silent on the question of
disclosure, but the parties subsequently filed a joint motion to clarify that
the reports were to be confidential. The district court agreed, ordering that
the reports could be disseminated only to those persons permitted by the court
for good cause shown. Since then, the district court has found good cause
twice. First, it permitted disclosure to the Office of Thrift Supervision at the request of both
parties, and second, it permitted disclosure to the House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform at the request of the SEC. The appeals
court rejected the argument that the report became a public document when it
was provided to the government. Such a transfer of possession, said the panel,
is not itself sufficient to render the report a public record.