Noting the lack of meaningful cooperation between the SEC and the
CFTC regarding MF Global, the Subcommittee recommends that Congress explore
whether customers and investors would be better served if the SEC and the CFTC
streamline their operations or merge into a single financial regulatory agency
that would have oversight of capital markets as a whole. Referencing MF Global,
the House panel discerned an apparent inability of the SEC and CFTC to
coordinate their regulatory oversight efforts or to share vital information with
one another, coupled with the reality that futures products, markets and market
participants have converged. Had the SEC and the CFTC coordinated their
supervision and shared critical information about MF Global, said the report, they
might have gained a more complete understanding of the company’s deteriorating
financial health, and they might taken action to better protect the company’s
customers and investors before it collapsed.
On October 31, 2011, MF Global filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. On the
same day, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation began liquidation
proceedings for MF Global’s U.S.-based subsidiary, MF Global, Inc.and the U.S
District Court appointed a trustee to handle the company’s liquidation. Although
initial reports estimated that $700 million in customer funds required to be
housed in separate accounts for safekeeping were missing, said the House
report, it is now known that MF Global’s
collapse resulted in a $1.6 billion shortfall in customer funds.
MF Global’s ability to amass more than $6.3 billion in European
sovereign debt without fully disclosing the size and nature of its European portfolio
also raises congressional concerns about the sufficiency of off-balance sheet
reporting requirements under US GAAP and SEC regulations, said the report,
which noted that FINRA has proposed a rule requiring member companies to
disclose the gross contract value of European
RTM trades that are derecognized from their balance sheets in a supplementary schedule
for quarterly FOCUS reports. In addition, FASB has tentatively voted to amend
its accounting guidance to require RTM transactions to be accounted for as
secured borrowings.
An RTM differs from a traditional repurchase agreement in one
important respect. In a traditional
repurchase agreement, the securities held by a counterparty are returned to the
borrowing company before the securities collateralizing the borrowing reach
maturity. By contrast, in an RTM transaction, the counterparty keeps the
pledged securities as collateral until they mature, whereupon the counterparty
may either return the securities to the borrowing company or redeem them from
their issuer at par value. According to the House report, MF Global learned
that by entering into RTM transactions collateralized with European sovereign
bonds (the European RTM trades) it could realize an immediate profit on the
difference between the interest the issuer of the bonds paid to MF Global and
the rate the company paid to its counterparty to repurchase the bonds, and that
it could derecognize the bonds from its balance sheet.
Regarding credit rating agencies, the report noted that, while
Moody’s and S&P acknowledged that MF Global’s transformation into an investment
bank would increase the company’s risk profile as it took on greater proprietary trading positions, the
credit rating agencies did not sufficiently review MF Global’s public filings to
identify these risks when they did emerge. Indeed, the Subcommittee found that,
despite the information that was available to them for a period of five months,
Moody’s and S&P did not factor MF Global’s European sovereign debt exposure
into its public credit assessments until one week before the firm filed for
bankruptcy.
In order to address the problems raised by sudden downgrades,
the Subcommittee called for a congressional review of whether the SEC should require
each NRSRO to establish and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to provide for periodic monitoring of credit ratings and periodic
communications to the market about the NRSRO’s monitoring practices. The
Subcommittee believes that some form of periodic review could instill a greater
level of scrutiny and diligence in the ratings process and give investors more confidence
that the ratings they receive are current.
The report found that MF Global customers who traded abroad
faced the risk that the funds set aside in secured accounts would not readily
be available to satisfy their claims upon the firm’s bankruptcy and subsequent
liquidation. Customers who traded
foreign futures and options executed and cleared trades on foreign exchanges,
which were beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. authorities. In light of this, the Subcommittee recommends
that the House Committee on Agriculture consider whether to direct the CFTC to
study whether it can better mitigate the risks that customers of futures
commission merchant face when customer funds are placed in secured accounts
subject to the law of a foreign jurisdiction.
In conducting any such study, said the Subcommittee, the CFTC should consider whether the rules that govern trading on foreign exchanges should be amended to establish protections comparable to those that govern domestic transactions. In particular, the CFTC should consider whether any potential rule change could impose costs on futures commission merchants and their customers that would place foreign futures and options trading at a competitive disadvantage to similar products and services.
In conducting any such study, said the Subcommittee, the CFTC should consider whether the rules that govern trading on foreign exchanges should be amended to establish protections comparable to those that govern domestic transactions. In particular, the CFTC should consider whether any potential rule change could impose costs on futures commission merchants and their customers that would place foreign futures and options trading at a competitive disadvantage to similar products and services.
Under its primary dealer program, the New York Fed grants
financial companies the privilege of acting as counterparties to open market
operations executed by the New York Fed. In the view of the Subcommittee, MF Global’s risk management failures, chronic
net losses, and untested business strategy, combined with the New York Fed’s
internal concerns that MF Global posed reputational risks, should have given
the New York Fed pause before conferring primary dealer status on MF Global. Even
though the subsidiary met the basic requirements to become a primary dealer,
the New York Fed should have, at a minimum, placed the firm’s application on
hold until MF Global’s new business strategy had been successfully implemented.
Thus, in order to discourage companies from utilizing a primary
dealer designation beyond its intended purpose, the Subcommittee recommends
that the New York Fed strengthen its application guidelines to expressly forbid
companies from speaking publicly about their application status during the
pendency of the application unless required for regulatory disclosure
purposes. If an applicant company
ignores the disclosure prohibition, emphasized the House panel, the New York Fed
should consider instituting a cooling-off period, similar to the one-year delay
for material regulatory actions. The Subcommittee further recommends that the
New York Fed consider re-examining its primary dealer selection process to
provide for greater scrutiny of companies with questionable financial health,
risk management histories, and ambitious business strategies.