According to Mr. Pitt, when the SEC adopted Rule 206(4)-6 under
the Investment Advisers Act, the hope was that institutional money managers
would articulate a voting policy and then later people could see how well they
lived up to that policy. But, in his view, the Egan-Jones Proxy Services no-action
letter suggests that investment managers fearful of a conflict could adopt a
policy saying that to avoid all conflicts they will obtain the views of a proxy
advisory firm and vote in accordance with those views. The no-action letter says
that if you do that you have then eliminated conflicts. Taken together, the
former Chair noted, the two no-action letters create a regulatory environment
in which portfolio managers believe that if they outsource the vote they have
avoided major problems under Rule 206(4)-6 and their own fiduciary obligations.
The ISS no-action talked of whether there is a conflict
between the proxy advisory firm and the investment adviser which, while
relevant, is less significant than the issue of whether there is a conflict between
the proxy advisory firm and the subject matter being voted on.
These no-action letters have the effect of rules, emphasized
former Chairman Pitt, essentially revising an existing rule. Until these
no-action letters are repealed, he noted, the SEC will be hard pressed to go
after people who outsource their votes to proxy advisory firms.
The SEC has announced in its 2013 rulemaking agenda that it intends
to review the issues around proxy advisory firms, observed former Chairman
Pitt, but he added that there is no real assurance that this is anything more
than an aspirational goal as opposed to a binding commitment on the part of the
Commission. The SEC will eventually have to take action, he said, but that will
mean confronting what the two no-action letters have achieved.